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Abstract 
While contingency and negation are relatively well-established notions in the theoretical analysis of 
international relations, their practical implications remain under-conceptualised. In order to discuss 
the question of how to act under conditions of contingency and negation, this paper, in a first step, 
triangulates both with Aristotelian noesis. Such triangulation suggests that consequences of political 
action cannot be predicted and have always inadvertent consequences due to the contingent and his-
torically and intellectually negated and refutable (even self-refutable) character of politics. It there-
fore appears as irresponsible to enact policies with interminable consequences. Rather, responsible 
political action – which is responsible precisely as, and only if, it accounts for contingency and nega-
tion – must hence act only in such a way that its consequences are reversible. In a second step, policy 
theory is critically reviewed in light of reversibility and its underlying philosophical principles, try-
ing to bridge political philosophy and policy studies for a mutually enriched analysis of politics. 
Such a bridging exercise can not only bring enhanced normative reflection into policy studies, but in 
reverse hints at the crucial aspect of the non-linear unfolding of action consequences which is, next 
to questions for a future research agenda, discussed in the concluding section. These discussions are 
understood as a twofold, yet interlinked contribution: first, to develop a concept of reversibility as 
practical response to the philosophical notions of contingency and negation; and second, to bridge 
two different paradigms, encouraging the synergy of scholarly expertise for the management of con-
temporary international and global problems.  
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Towards a Political Concept of Reversibility in International Relations: 




While contingency and negation are relatively well-established notions in the theoretical analysis of 
international relations, their practical implications remain under-conceptualised. In order to discuss 
the question of how to act under conditions of contingency and negation, this paper, in a first step, 
triangulates both with Aristotelian noesis. Such triangulation suggests that consequences of political 
action cannot be predicted and have always inadvertent consequences due to the contingent and his-
torically and intellectually negated and refutable (even self-refutable) character of politics. It there-
fore appears as irresponsible to enact policies with interminable consequences. Rather, responsible 
political action – which is responsible precisely as, and only if, it accounts for contingency and nega-
tion – must hence act only in such a way that its consequences are reversible. In a second step, policy 
theory is critically reviewed in light of reversibility and its underlying philosophical principles, try-
ing to bridge political philosophy and policy studies for a mutually enriched analysis of politics. 
Such a bridging exercise can not only bring enhanced normative reflection into policy studies, but in 
reverse hints at the crucial aspect of the non-linear unfolding of action consequences which is, next 
to questions for a future research agenda, discussed in the concluding section. These discussions are 
understood as a twofold, yet interlinked contribution: first, to develop a concept of reversibility as 
practical response to the philosophical notions of contingency and negation; and second, to bridge 
two different paradigms, encouraging the synergy of scholarly expertise for the management of con-
temporary international and global problems.  
 




Political problems in the 21st century demand radical imagination to cope with the most serious glob-
al challenges. The consequences of these problems existentially concern present and further genera-
tions as they fundamentally put the conditions of our societies and of the world at risk. For tackling 
respective problems, mono-paradigm and mono-disciplinary ways to analyse politics and to design 
policies are limited and in need of renegotiation. Radical imagination includes the questioning of the 
ways in which we are used to think and act in order to synergise expertise across and between disci-
plines and sub-disciplines to learn from each other. Researchers, political analysts, and policy-
makers must jointly develop new approaches to research and to political action. The synergy of 
cross-paradigm research across humanities and social sciences (and natural sciences, too) is therefore 
more conducive than epistemological and methodological silos. Concretely, this paper bridges phi-
losophy in International Relations (IR) and policy process studies, speaking initially to two audienc-
es, however, ultimately attempting to create a new audience through the interlocution of these two 
disciplines.  
This bridging exercise between political philosophy in IR and policy studies seeks to create 
an avenue to develop normative thinking in policy studies and to move IR theory out of its theoreti-
cal corner into the terrain of political practice and policy-making. This interlocution addresses both 
the generic theory-practice problem in IR and provides an action-theoretical orientation in order to 
progress from reflection on the conditions of the possibility to a conceptual consideration of the pos-
sibility of responsible politics. This progress offers guidance dealing with contemporary political 
problems in a pluralist and contingent world in which we need policy norms without prescribing or 
determining the content of politics. As the bridging exercise has reciprocal learning effects, a concept 
of reversibility also needs to analyse the non-linearity, negation, and refutation of the temporal un-
folding of policy consequences as alluded to by policy process studies. 
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In the study of international politics, particularly in critical IR (inter alia Rengger/Thirkell-
White, 2011),1 contingency and negation have become acknowledged notions (inter alia Anievas, 
2016; Katzenstein, 2018; Kessler, 2016; Kratochwil, 1991; Levine, 2012) due to the reception of a 
diverse spectrum of social and political theories.2 Yet although the theory-practice relation plays an 
important part in IR (inter alia Kratochwil, 2003; Lepgold, 1998; Zalewski, 1996; Smith, 2003; from 
a more orthodox IR angle, see Walt, 2005), the question of how contingency and dialectic negation 
inform political practice remains underdeveloped. Therefore, this paper explores the question of 
what kind of action and policies conclude from the non-linearity and perspectivity of contingent and 
always refuting and refuted politics. We need to go further than ‘just’ prudential, ‘realist’ admoni-
tions to choose the lesser evil (Morgenthau, 1945; also Molloy 2009), important as this insight is.  
In order to explore this question of the practical implications of the notions of contingency 
and dialectic negation, this paper triangulates both with the Aristotelian notion of noesis (which 
stresses the prime status of the human experience of political uncertainties, indeterminacies, and con-
tingencies, emphasising the analytical awareness of the correspondence of political order with such 
experience). Seeing contingency, negation, and noesis as co-constitutive and irreducible conceptual 
elements of political ethics (Baumann, 1993),3 provides insights into what responsible political ac-
tion mindful of the tensions of politics in a contingent and pluralist world would be like. Consequent-
ly, politics should and must not attempt to dissolve these tensions by claiming final answers and by 
acting upon them.4 Instead, we need to adopt a politics of reversibility, which will be developed in 
this paper as the scrutiny of policy consequences according to whether or not they harm the princi-
ples of contingency and negation. This implies that if policy decisions harm the principles of contin-
gency and negation, then a politics of reversibility would stop the implementation of those policies. 
Policy-making therefore must be action-theoretically guided by the principle of non-irreversibility,5 
i.e., by planning and implementing policies which do not violate or undermine contingency and ne-
gation as intrinsic conditions of politics.6  
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The paper proceeds in two main steps. The first section outlines the triangulation of contin-
gency, negation, and noesis, examining the formulation of each concept in the political and social 
theories of Hans Morgenthau (on contingency), Herbert Marcuse (on negation), and Eric Voegelin 
(on noesis),7 and showing their relationship to the theme of reversibility in IR. The second section 
explores the contribution of a concept of reversibility to policy process studies. The purpose of this 
section is the attempt to explore the possibilities of a philosophical understanding of reversibility for 
a more practical engagement with politics. Policy process studies have been chosen for such a first 
step to render a philosophical concept more practical as they make very similar observations of poli-
tics.8 Their ontological observation (even though they would not term them ‘ontological’) of non-
linearity and inadvertent action consequences which negate and refute policy planning (Sharkansky, 
2002; Weible, 2014; Wilson, 1989; Zahariadis, 2014) is a promising way to bring in reversibility. 
However, they exclude to account for the epistemological consequences of this observation, disal-
lowing, as will be shown below, for normative thinking. This discussion reveals that policy process 
studies underplay the question of contingency and non-linearity in politics and that a concept of re-
versibility suggests an important move in policy studies towards a more reflective and normative un-
derstanding of policy processes. The Conclusion develops further questions for a future research 
agenda, which outline the temporal implications of reversibility and bring in the concept of reversi-
bility into policy-making. 
 
On contingency, negation, and noesis 
On the triangulation of contingency, negation, and noesis 
Thinking in terms of the triangulation of contingency, dialectic negation, and noesis suggests that all 
three are to be regarded as “gleichursprünglich” (‘co-original’, in a Habermasian sense; see Haber-
mas, 2008, 1994) for the understanding and analysis of politics. This implies most importantly that 
they function as co-equal, co-constitutive, and irreducible characteristics of politics. This implies, 
6 
 
too, that neither becomes dissolved or suspended (“aufgehoben” in a Hegelian sense; Hegel, 1975) in 
and through the triangulating process. Each remains its full relevance, regardless of whether, or to 
which degree, each of the other two become temporarily important or emphasised in politics and in 
political analysis. That is, the notion of contingency continues to describe and capture the ontological 
situation of the perspectivity and resulting ambivalence of politics; the notion of dialectic negation 
retains both its ontological and epistemological relevance for revealing the contradiction and 
(self)refutation of political action and thought; and the apperceiving capacity of noesis defines a 
grounded form of political judgement which is deeply aware of, and self-consciously comprehends, 
the contingency and negation of its own and of politics’ contexts and horizons.  
 The triangulation of these ontological, epistemological, and psychological aspects outlines 
and enables a political ethics which proceeds from the mainly deconstructive notions of contingency 
and negation/refutation to a positive concept (namely that of reversibility) that orients and guides po-
litical analysis and political action. This progression becomes possible through the reflective 
(self)awareness of the conditions of politics (which is contingent and always potentially negating) 
through noesis. Noesis helps to break out of the circle of critique and reflection and delivers a recon-
structive and rearticulating analytical and practically actionable norm, which orients and guides poli-
tics without defining and fixing the content of politics as this would violate and undermine the two 
other notions of contingency and negation. Noesis drafts theoretical and political openness towards, 
and apperceiving reflection upon, contingency and negation as intrinsic ontological and epistemolog-
ical conditions of politics. It thus triangulates contingency and negation and incorporates them into 
normative political thinking. Through noesis, contingency and negation become thus illuminated and 
tangible to and for themselves. 
The rationale for this triangulation emerges from the argument that if politics and political 
knowledge are contingent, perspectivist, and negated and thus of deconstructing quality, we need a 
normative yardstick for rearticulating political order and political agency. And contingency as time-
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space perspectivity and negation as refutability of politics, triangulated with noesis as the reflective 
capacity on, and rearticulating practical norm of, both result in the practical demand that policies are 
reversible or at least non-irreversible. The paper turns now to the discussion of contingency, nega-
tion, and noesis to specify them in their own right and to be able render their triangulation more pre-
cisely thereafter. 
 
Perspectivity and the contingency of political action and knowledge  
“(All) theoretical analyses are contingent upon factors of 
whose occurrences we either know nothing or whose con-
sequences we cannot foresee” (Morgenthau, 1962a: 70) 
 
Perhaps surprisingly to many in IR, few figures exemplify the importance of contingency better than 
Hans Morgenthau. There are several threads throughout his oeuvre where Morgenthau stresses that 
all theory and political action is contingent upon factors of which we had no knowledge, and conse-
quences, which we could not predict and at best can only calculate probabilistically. Drawing on Karl 
Mannheim’s use of the German term ‘standortgebunden’ to describe the spatial and temporal condi-
tionality of political and social theory and knowledge (Mannheim, 1936; 1984) Morgenthau claims  
that political theory and action always depend upon the historic and cultural environment in which 
they have been formulated and in which they are supposed to operate. These terms thus endorse a 
perspectivist understanding of an object revealing characteristics of itself only in relation to perspec-
tives applied.9 
Accordingly, all social and political knowledge is historically and spatially contingent. In Mor-
genthau’s probably most cited text, in his ‘Principles of Political Realism’, we find no less than three 
paragraphs in which he explains this position.10 But also in addition to these statements, he argues 
explicitly in The Concept of the Political (2012 [1933]) and in ’The Intellectual and Political Func-
tions of a Theory of International Relations’ (1962a) for contingency and perspectivity which coin-
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cides with his criticism of the rationalist and positivist ideas of historical progress, techniques of so-
cial engineering, and the rationality of the ‘Age of Reason’. All of these would all require a universal 
standpoint of knowledge from which to derive their ideas and respective strategies for their realiza-
tion.11 
We thus recognize in Morgenthau’s arguments the critical stance of perspectivism towards 
three prominent theories of knowledge (Behr, 2013). First, it is critical about a rationalist approach to 
overcome the confinements of human knowledge through the construction of knowledge of the ex-
ternal world out of principles possessed by the mind itself.12 Second, this notion is also adverse to an 
empiricism which would base knowledge about the political world on sensually conceived impres-
sions and which would rely in its assertions about the world on (ostensibly) mind-independent data 
bruta, i.e. methodologically on positivist quantifications and measurements of social and political 
phenomena, built on the hope that through inductive logic there may be some day some kind of spill-
over from data collection to knowledge. (Holt et al., 1960: 152). And third, the notion of perspectivi-
ty, because it recognizes the mind-independent, however spatio-temporally qualified status of things 
real, ‘strips mind of its pretensions, but not of its value or greatness (…) [This notion] dethrones the 
mind, [and at the same time] recognizes mind as chief in the world’ (Alexander, 1960: 186). We here 
further recognize an anti-idealist position against the belief in a ‘world in which there exist only 
minds’ (Holt et al., 1960: 154, 155). In this vein, Morgenthau notes: 
(Theory) consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes 
that the character of a (…) policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the polit-
ical acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts (…) Yet examination of 
the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must 
approach political reality with a kind of rationale outline, a map that suggests to us (…) possi-
ble meanings of (…) policy (from the First of his ‘Six Principles …’). 
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Therefore, the epistemological underpinning of perspectivism consists in the acknowledgment of the 
existence of mind-independent political realities in which, however, the mind plays a paramount role 
in that these mind-independent realities become meaningful only through theoretical understanding. 
Further to this, these ‘facts’ are not to be seen as structurally alike, but have to be studied and under-
stood in their contingent spatio-temporal constellations. This epistemological position posits that 
both the thing-being-observed and the observer mutually influence and constitute each other in the 
political world and in political analysis (see also Taylor, 1971). 
 
Dialectic negation and the fallibility of political action and concepts 
“(The) process of reality (…) defies formalization and sta-
bilization, because it is the very negation of every stable 
form. The facts and relations that appear in this process 
change their nature at every phase of the development.” 
(Marcuse, 1941: 144) 
 
The second notion involved in developing a political concept of reversibility is the idea of dialectic 
negation as we know it from Frankfurt School Critical Theory. To develop this idea, I will draw 
mainly on Herbert Marcuse, particularly from his Negations: Essays in Critical Theory (1968). Ac-
cording to the anti-metaphysical stance of critical theory, i.e., one of the main differences between 
‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ theory, dialectic negation is targeted against any speculation and assump-
tion about an essence and telos of history, society, and humanity (especially Horkheimer, 1999 
(1937)). Against such assumptions, critical theorists stress the study of historical experience and em-
pirical historical inquiry into the genealogy of socio-political transformations. Thus, in the Introduc-
tion to One-dimensional Man, Marcuse describes critical theory as the attempt to elaborate historical 
alternatives to actual pathways of societal developments (1964); and in Negations, he writes: 
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Through [critical theory], given facts are understood as appearances whose essence can be 
comprehended only in the context of particular historical tendencies aiming at a different form 
of reality. The theory’s historical interest enters constitutively into its conceptual scheme and 
makes the transcendence of ‘facts’ towards their essence critical and polemic’ (1968: 71). 
This takes us to the core of critical theory’s notion of dialectic negation. To find those historical al-
ternatives and possibilities of their realization, including why certain pathways of historical devel-
opment have dominated over others, historical inquiry is linked to the ideas of emancipation and lib-
eration. The awareness and elaboration of historical alternatives and potentialities underline humani-
ty’s potential in relation to social, political, and economic conditions. Here, Marcuse speaks to us as 
if he were driven to rescue some of the Enlightenment promises so pessimistically dismantled by his 
peers Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer (in their Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1981 [1944]). 
This road to permanent and always possible negation and alternatives leads to the notion of ‘dialec-
tic’. Marcuse writes: 
Materialist theory thus transcends the given state of fact and moves towards a different potenti-
ality, proceeding from immediate appearance to the essence that appears in it. But here appear-
ance and essence become members of a real antithesis arising from the particular historical 
structure of the social process of life. The essence of man and of things appears within that 
structure; what men and things could genuinely be appears in “bad”, “perverted” form. At the 
same time, however, appears the possibility of negating this perversion and realizing in history 
that which could be. This antagonistic character of the historical process as it is today turns the 
opposition of essence and appearance into a dialectical relationship and this relationship into an 
object of the dialectic (1968: 67). 
The idea of dialectic negation thus relates not only to material, historical events, but also and im-
portantly to the awareness and consciousness of the theoretician. Dialectic negation comprises an 
ontological and an epistemological dimension because the theoretician not only studies historical ‘re-
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alities’ and ‘potentialities’, but needs to be aware of and self-consciously build in a dialectic of their 
own argument. The relation between thesis and anti-thesis and their permanent forward-drive is of 
both materialistic and intellectual character. This means that we as researchers and political agents 
need to be always aware of the potential and actual negation of our own argument and should even 
push and develop our own arguments towards their limits and finally their own negation. In ‘Tradi-
tional and critical theory’, Horkheimer, too, briefly reflects upon the role of the theorist: 
(The person of the theoretician) exercises an aggressive critique not only against the conscious 
defenders of the status quo, but against distracting, conformist, or Utopian tendencies within 
his own household (1999: 214). 
However, critical theory goes further and argues that the theoretician is in a position to experience 
historical potentialities that have never been realized. This envisioning seems only possible through a 
proactive dialectic forward-development of the own theoretical argument and analysis that negates 
itself as soon as it is made. And indeed, this seems to be the idea when Marcuse writes: ‘Reality is 
overcome by being comprehended as the mere possibility of another reality’ (1968: 83). For the de-
velopment of a political concept of reversibility, Marcuse’s perception of the theory-practice relation 
is important. In Negations he writes: 
What, however, if the development outlined by the theory does not occur? What if the forces 
that were to bring about the transformation are suppressed and appear to be defeated? Little as 
the theory’s truth is thereby contradicted, it nevertheless appears then in a new light which il-
luminates new aspects and elements of its object’ (Ibid.: 142). 
Irrespective of this problematic statement on the relation between theory and practice, the notion of 
dialectic negation encourages the theoretician, finally everyone, to be aware of the permanent nega-
tion of politics and of the likewise permanent counter-possibility of one’s own argument. This notion 
therefore includes the necessity of permanent self-criticality and refutability as either a concurrent 
aspect within or as a procedural aspect subsequent to one’s own argument and political action. 
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The normative triangulation of perspectivity and negation with noesis 
“The center of a (practical) philosophy of politics (is) a the-
ory of consciousness [of order in which] nous symbolizes 
the human experience of order” (Voegelin, 1978: 3-5) 
 
The arguments about space-time-contingency of political knowledge and agency as well as of nega-
tion need to be complemented and framed within the notion of noesis. Voegelin elaborates the notion 
of noesis going back the distinction between, on the one side, knowledge and prudence and doxa and 
opinion on the other in Plato’s Sophistes and Aristotle’s discussion of intellectual virtues in Book VI, 
Chapter V, Nichomachean Ethics. How does this relate to contingency/perspectivity and negation? 
Fundamentally, noesis, informed by knowledge and prudence, is a principle for the normative formu-
lation of politics which triangulates perspectivist and dialectic critique. According to Aristotle, pru-
dence (also translated as practical wisdom, practical judgement or phronesis) has to do with practice 
and the variable, is therefore mainly concerned with knowledge of particular and contingent facts 
(Ibid. 1141b15). It is thus a practical, normative principle which accounts for contingency and nega-
tion/refutability. However, while noesis provides normative direction, this direction needs again to be 
qualified. And this qualification is accomplished by perspectivity/contingency and negation. The no-
etic articulation of politics thus needs itself a mechanism of critique that is built-in this normative 
articulation itself and which consists of perspectivity and negation. But what exactly does Voegelin 
mean by noesis?  
Noesis is an intellectual operation, accounting for ‘the variable’ and the particular, that critical-
ly reflects upon the degree – and creates an awareness of this degree – to which political order, its 
institutions, and its symbols correspond to humanity as the anthropological constitution of politics. 
Thus, noesis is a device of political judgment that is aware of, and judges whether, or not, political 
action and policies violate or apprehend humanity. But as what is humanity imagined? Voegelin re-
fers to an intellectual figure which he calls in neo-Aristotelian language the ‘divine ground of exist-
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ence’13 according to which human existence and politics is perceived as tension between existential 
questions that are neither tangible, nor answerable; sometimes they are not even effable.14 Such in-
tangibilities and ineffabilities are not a deficiency of a dark age or of a not yet fully developed con-
sciousness. They are rather indicating the fundamental human condition of the intellectual and prac-
tical limitations of contingent and perspectivist human knowledge, action, and politics; i.e., there will 
always be unanswerable questions of human and political life, and subsequently uncontrollable and 
non-manageable political conditions and consequences. According to Voegelin, this is to be 
acknowledged and respected (apperceived) and not to be violated by knowledge claims that pretend 
to have definitive answers. This is Voegelin’s main argument against political ideologies and of all 
politics, respectively, that would become ideological precisely when and if they promote knowledge 
claims that pretend to have final answers as to the meaning of politics and history and that pursue 
policies based on such claims (1999 [1938]). ‘The refusal to apperceive’, Voegelin notes, ‘has be-
come […] the central concept for the understanding of ideological aberrations and deformations’ 
(2006: 125). Subsequently, it is crucial for responsible politics to be aware of the tension of human 
beings’ existence as living in a spectrum of intangibilities and ineffabilities and to not attempt to dis-
solve this tension by claiming final answers and by acting upon them (Voegelin, 2006: 98). 
The awareness and consciousness of such tension as the fundamental human condition is what 
Voegelin calls noetic ‘apperception’. Thus, apperception results from the experience and awareness 
of the human condition. Further to this, apperception can recapture humanity in politics through this 
awareness and its emphasis in the case of politics that violates the human condition.  
Recapturing reality in opposition to its contemporary deformation requires a considerable 
amount of work. One has to reconstruct the fundamental categories of existence, experience, 
consciousness, and reality. One has at the same time to explore the technique and structure of 
the deformations that clutter up the daily routine; and one has to develop the concepts by which 
existential deformation and its symbolic expression can be categorized (Voegelin, 2006: 121). 
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Rehearsal: the triangulation of contingency, negation, and noesis and the politics of 
reversibility 
The discussion of contingency, negation, and noesis leads to three insights. Contingency includes the 
time-space-perspectivity of political knowledge and the socio-political embeddedness of political 
theory and action. The notion of negation includes, too, a theoretical and practical proposition. This 
proposition holds that there is always another, a next viewpoint and thus no absolute certainty about, 
and finality of, one’s own theoretical and political view and practice; i.e., ‘clinging to any one posi-
tion would commit error because of the intrinsically limited viewpoint of any one subject, which in 
turn suggested the necessity of engaging with opposing ways of thinking’ (Brincat 2014: 590). Con-
sequently, this proposition leads to the necessity of an inherent and permanent critique towards own 
theories and practices and reasons the crucial awareness of the refutability and fallibility of one’s 
own approach. This might be because of concrete historical alternatives or counter-arguments to ac-
tual political strategies. This proposition hence includes the demand that the theoretician and the 
politician should always procure for and anticipate alternatives and to account for this in his/her theo-
retical views and political actions. And noesis stresses the prime status of human experience of poli-
tics, emphasising the significance of uncertainties, indeterminacies, and contingencies as well as the 
analytical awareness of whether, or not, political order corresponds to human experience. Put differ-
ently, political order and policies need to resonate with human experience that is always the experi-
ence of an indeterminate, contingent, self-refuting, and fallible political world. 
 The notion of noesis does include the Aristotelian concept of phronesis as a grounded form of 
political judgement that is aware of its own limited context and horizons as also argued by David M 
McCourt (2012). However, contrary to McCourt’s understanding who rightfully stresses the aspect 
of pluralism, of deliberation, and of phronesis as a form of knowing, phronesis does, as he perceives 
it, not consist in a distinct political strategy or decision. In contrast, phronesis is primarily a device of 
practical judgement of political action which, in order to account for pluralism, contingency (‘the 
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variable’ in Aristotle’s terminology) and negation, is less oriented towards substantive decisions and 
a political prescription of what would be prudent, and what not, but rather, precisely because it ac-
counts for contingency and negation, in excluding certain forms of political conduct and political ac-
tion from being prudent. What is prudent, and what not, is thus a quality of political conduct acting in 
such a (in a particular) way so that action consequences would not contradict contingency and nega-
tion, with, however, no specific prescription or definition of the content of politics. In this vein, Aris-
totle argues that phronesis is not about producing things/politics (Nicomachean Ethics, 1143b27).  
But noesis also includes another important element of phronesis, namely the emphasis on the 
particular, the situational, and the contingent as also Martha Nussbaum stresses when she speaks of 
the ‘priority of the particular’ in Aristotle’s phronesis (1990: 66; also Devereux 1986). This element 
also plays an important role in Bent Flyvbjerg’s conceptualisation of phronetic planning research 
(2004). Flyvbjerg links Aristotelian phronesis with mainly Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault 
because a contemporary concept of phronesis would need to incorporate “power”, absent in Aristotle 
(so Flyvbjerg 2001, Chapters 7, 8). However, since it seems he is mainly concerned with theoretical 
and methodological questions of research and not with political action and policy-making, it remains 
finally unclear whether phronesis, according to Flyvbjerg, is a quality of political agency, which 
guides, or should guide, action, or of the researcher which should guide research studying the partic-
ular and contingent. Because of this unclarity, his conceptualisation is of limited use for the argument 
here; however, important for the conceptualisation of reversibility and its triangulation of noesis with 
contingency/perspectivity and negation/refutability remains the interpretation that phronesis is aware 
of the particular, pluralist, and contingent element of politics. This is important to finally specify no-
esis as partially similar, but also distinct from phronesis. 
While the phronimos, i.e., the one who possesses phronesis, is self-aware and reflective of 
acting with moderation in a pluralist and contingent environment with attention to the particular (or 
at least of the norm to act in such a way), phronesis does not include the analytical awareness of 
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whether, or not, in the bigger picture certain policies and political reality account for contingen-
cy/perspectivity and negation/refutability as noetic ‘apperception’ does. Thus, noesis includes 
phronesis, but goes a decisive step beyond individual action in that it includes an analytical capacity 
of political order as a whole (also Corey 2002: 57; 72, 73). However, it also needs to be qualified, or 
‘re-engaged’ in light of ‘particular actions, policies, constitutions, and so forth’ (ibid.: 68, 71), a task 
which the notions of contingency/perspectivity and negation/refutability provide. Yet, while negation 
suggests ceaseless critique – ‘a perennial method of criticism’ (Adorno 2006: Nr. 152), developed in 
IR by Daniel Levine (2012) and Shannon Brincat who writes that dialectics ‘incessantly abuts, con-
fronts, and attempts to sublate those dominant ways of thinking’ (2014: 589), emphasised here 
through the permanent dialectic forward-drive of argument and counter-argument according to Mar-
cuse, finally resulting in negation’s refutability and self-refutability of political action and political 
views15 – this deconstructive activity is not sufficient in itself to answer the question of responsible 
and ethical political agency and thus needs again qualification. It is not sufficient because ceaseless 
criticism is a mainly theoretical activity, which needs some kind of breakthrough and cut-out into 
action and therefore needs the introduction of a qualifying normative and reconstructive moment. 
Such a moment it receives through noesis’s reflective and apperceiving awareness of, and judgment 
about, the existence of humanity and of the prime role of human experience in political order.  
 This role of human experience, so demands triangulation, must, however, not only be quali-
fied and eventually constrained by dialectic negation, but also by contingency and perspectivity. 
These notions situate each theoretician and the politician within a distinct historical context and 
event horizon, which not only must be critiqued, but also explains the very position(s) held and ad-
vanced in academic debates and in the political arena. This crucial insight from Mannheim’s sociolo-
gy of knowledge and its adoption by Morgenthau (as discussed above) is a crucial understanding of 
theory and practice in ‘reflexive realism’ which needs (again) practical orientation (see for this re-
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quest the Special Issue by Behr/Williams, 2017; also Steele, 2007, as well as Harraway, 1988; Hoe-
ber-Rudolph, 2005).  
As we have seen, no single notion – neither contingency, nor negation, nor noesis – is suffi-
cient in and for itself for outlining responsible and ethical politics; each needs to be qualified through 
the two other notions. For practical political action, the mutual qualification of these notions through 
triangulation yields a concept of political reversibility: If the consequences of political action (and 
policy making) cannot be predicted due to the contingent character of the political and human world, 
and, furthermore, are historically and intellectually refutable (even self-refutable) due to dialectic 
negation, it appears as irresponsible to enact policies which materialise in eternal or set-in-stone con-
sequences and thus contradict contingency and negation. Responsible political action – which is re-
sponsible precisely as, and only if, it accounts for and is, through apperceiving reflection, aware of 
contingency and negation as intrinsic conditions of politics – must hence act only in such a way that 
its consequences are at least partially reversible and can be turned back if found to violate the princi-
ples of contingency and negation. This practical conclusion through triangulation can be further 
specified through Marcuse’s discussion of negation:  
Only such a mode of existence can incorporate the negative into the positive. Negative and 
positive cease to be opposed to each other when the driving power of the subject makes nega-
tivity a part of the subject’s own unity … This is the mode of being or existence that Hegel 
describes as ‘real infinity.’ Infinity is not something behind or beyond finite things, but is 
their true reality. The infinite is the mode of existence in which all potentialities are realized 
and in which all being reaches its ultimate form (Marcuse, 1941: 69). 
The benefit of triangulation becomes immediately visible here as it enables us to see the potentiali-
ties of all ‘things’ unravelled through ‘real infinity’, but – rendered comprehensible only through tri-
angulating negation with contingency and self-reflective and apperceiving awareness – also their lim-
itation and context-dependency as all ‘things’ are never finite and ceaselessly develop towards and 
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into an unknown future. This is a situation which action-theoretically can be accounted for only 
through avoiding the creation of ‘things’ (speak: policy consequences) which were determined, stat-
ic, or fixed, thus only through reversibility.  
In order to examine these philosophical ideas in their significance for empirical-practical po-
litical analysis, the next section will discuss possible avenues of these philosophical notions into pol-
icy studies, illustrating the application and transferal of these philosophical notions to empirical-
practical analysis. This is not an attempt to ground contingency and negation beyond the philosophi-
cal discussions above in international policy analysis, but rather an effort to find out about the possi-
ble contributions which international political theory can make to policy analysis; and, through ex-
ploring such an avenue, to provide guidance and orientation in both policy analysis and finally in 
policy-making. 
 
Bringing the concept of reversibility into policy studies 
Irrespective of epistemological differences between the previous discussions and the understanding 
of theory in policy process studies as causal, explanatory, and falsifiable as well as hypotheses-
generating,16 this section makes the attempt to reflect upon possibilities of how the concept of revers-
ibility can contribute and relate to policy research, taking the common claim for the need of multiple 
theories seriously (see e.g. Cairney, 2012; Sabatier, 1999; Weible, 2014).  
An avenue for such a bridging is the common observation within policy process studies of the 
messiness, uncertainty, and ambiguity of policy processes. Ambiguity refers, according the Martha 
Feldmann, to ‘a state of having many ways of thinking about the same circumstance or phenomena’ 
(1989: 5) and is seen as an essential and inescapable characteristic of the policy process. In this vein, 
James Wilson makes us aware that more information may reduce uncertainty (1989: 228), however, 
does not abolish ambiguity. And Christopher Weible writes in an overview over the legacies and cur-
rent challenges of policy research that ‘(if) anything has endured regarding the study of policy pro-
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cesses, it has been an understanding that these phenomena are messy and that theory is necessary to 
help disentangle them’.17 Echoing this, Nikolas Zahariadis speaks of ‘organised anarchies’, and with 
reference to Ira Sharkansky (2002) not only emphasises the importance of contingency in and of pol-
icy processes, but also argues that ‘decisions are made as the process unfolds, and they may even be 
facilitated by opaqueness’ (Zahariadis 2014: 27).  
Zahariadis belongs to the group of policy researchers who promote the contingency notions 
of policy processes the most. This group argues – as he does with regard to the Multiple Streams Ap-
proach (MSA) – for a so-called ‘post-positivist’ opening of policy studies that, echoing one of the 
main problematics discussed in the first section of this paper, stresses the ‘unintended consequences’ 
of policies and policy processes (Schneider/Ingram/Deleon, 2014: 27).. Next to the Multiple Streams 
Approach in this regard are the social constructivist Democratic Policy Design-approach (see for ex-
ample Schneider/Ingram/Deleon 2014; Saurugger, 2013) and the Narrative Policy Framework 
(McBeth/Jones/Shanahan, 2014; Shanahan/Jones/McBeth/Lane, 2013).  
However – and this is in line with the scientific demands of policy research and their under-
standing of theory as explanatory, as external to the reality studied, and thus as abstract as possible 
from this reality (Sabatier, 1999: 266) – such awareness has so far failed to generate ontological re-
flection on the reality studied, i.e., on the policy process, nor to debates on how such reflection 
would epistemologically inform theory and analysis. Indeed, policy research seems to deliberately 
push aside ontological and epistemological discussions and ‘takes a purely pragmatic approach’ as 
Mark McBeth, Michael Jones, and Elizabeth Shanahan argue18 in their immediate response to post-
positivist critiques of their Narrative Policy Framework by Geoffrey Dudley (2000) and Wayne Par-
sons (2000). Consequently, contingency criteria are incorporated only as variables of model-building 
into policy theories that themselves have to be causal, consistent, and ‘clear enough to be wrong’. A 
subsequent demand is that methods and research technologies have to be developed that provide in-
formation about a messy and contingent world, however, in causal and consistent ways. This appears 
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as the squaring of a circle. A good example here is the Narrative Policy Framework and its incorpo-
ration and operationalisation of policy narratives as social constructions. Such incorporation occurred 
subsequent to ‘post-positivist’ influences in policy research. Interesting is, however, how McBeth, 
one of the founders of the framework, works the idea of narrative into his policy framework.  
 McBeth et al. write that ‘until very recently in public policy scholarship, the lack of adher-
ence to scientific standards was viewed as necessary to study the role of narrative in politics and pol-
icy. Infused with subjectivity and relativism, as recently as 2005, the study of narrative was declared 
incompatible with such scientific standards as validity and reliability’ (Sha-
nahan/Jones/McBeth/Lane, 2013: 454; see also Dodge/Ospina/Foldy, 2005: 287). Narrative was seen 
as a component of policy processes that could not be operationalised in causal and explanatory theo-
ries due to its subjective, relativistic, and contingent nature. What became at stake here was the con-
tested nature of ‘facts’ between data bruta and social construction as well as of appropriate methodo-
logical tools for their study, followed by the question of what is ‘science’ and what counts as 
‘knowledge’. Thus, this issue reached to the core of understanding research and the relation of the 
researcher to his/her world of study. Consequently policy research should take a reflective pause (yet 
another reflective pause, so to say, alluding to McBeth’s recent request and metaphor (2014: 454)), 
taking their contingency observations more seriously. And this would mean to not only treat them as 
variables which have to be operationalisable, quantifiable, and measurable, but rather to question 
whether their own contingency observations have epistemological implications on the kind of 
knowledge that they can achieve about (this) reality. 
I suggest that such a reflective pause can bring new awareness in policy research about the re-
lation between their ‘object’ and its study as well as about the shaping of this object through the re-
searcher. Such awareness would open-up the possibility of going beyond explanatory theory and the 
dominant question of how something happens in the policy world, to also address the question of 
what should and should not happen. This must not be a manual or prescription for policy, but would 
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explicitly provide normative orientation both for policy-makers and for a framework for the assess-
ment of policy. Such an orientation is suggested through the concept of reversibility, i.e., through the 
contribution of noesis in triangulation with perspectivity and negation. 
Such a move to normativity does not seem foreign to policy research (Weible 2014: 391),19 
however, it is only implicitly inherent whereas I am asking for a more conscious and explicit elabora-
tion of it. Thus, we need to ask what kind of policy is needed to accomplish social salience and to 
finally guarantee a democratic policy, without, however, becoming prescriptive? The notion of noe-
sis, as explained above, triangulated with perspectivity and negation, can help us answer this ques-
tion. Since the notions of contingency and of negation echo observations of perspectivity, context, 
and ambiguity of the research field, this acknowledgement has two political consequences: first, they 
demand ontological and epistemological humility as our primary relation to the world and translate 
politically into a politics of reversibility, which demands to not enact policies with non-irreversible 
consequences. And, as argued in the first section, this position, second, needs some reorientation and 
normative embedding which must not prescribe or develop a political manual as this would under-
mine the contingencies of the policy world, the inherent refutability of concepts, and the falsifiability 
of hypotheses about it. Such reorientation and embedding is provided by noesis as it articulates poli-
tics and political agency without fixing the content of politics, but rather is reflective of, and prag-




This leads to the development and outline of further research questions for a research agenda at the 
crossroads between political philosophy in IR and policy research. The main foci are two: first, the 
concept of reversibility has to be further elaborated through an engaged, critical dialogue with policy 
research. Second, the concept of reversibility needs to be further developed concretely in close coop-
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eration with policy-makers, be they state, intergovernmental, or NGO actors. Such a research agenda 
includes questions such as: How does a concept of reversibility translate into policy design and poli-
cy implementation? Are institutional mechanisms conceivable which would prevent consequences 
which harm contingency/perspectivity and negation and take effect when, and as soon as, such con-
sequences occur? Are such institutional mechanism accompanied, supported and facilitated by an 
ethical habitus of reversibility? Mechanisms to institutionalize reversibility need to respond to de-
ferred and complex time dimensions of the manifestations of consequences while at the same time 
apperceiving when and if such consequences solidify as irreversible. Thus, the persuading strength of 
reversibility plays out not in political trade-offs, but is based upon political ethics and institutional 
arrangements. As an important part of reversibility relates to the complexity and differentiation of 
action consequences and their unfolding as hinted at by policy process studies, an elaborated analysis 
of the time horizons of policy consequences is among the immediate further conceptual tasks. I can 
here only outline such an elaboration which has to focus on mainly two time dimensions. 
First, and subsequent to political action and policy implementation, reversibility appears a 
posteriori as ‘directional malleability’ (Tymieniecka, 2009: 39) or pliability of policy consequences, 
with the awareness, however, of never being able to overcome contingencies, ambivalences, and in-
advertent consequences. Metaphorically, reversibility corresponds with the idiom ‘between Scylla 
and Charybdis’ derived from Homer’s Odyssey (for this metaphor, see Steinberg, 2014), having to 
choose between two evils, but deciding for the lesser evil by rectifying and mitigating irreversible 
consequences through guidance provided by the triangulation of contingency/perspectivity, nega-
tion/refutability, and noesis. Second, reversibility also functions as an a priori reflection and ethical 
constraint for responsible political action and policy-making, which demands humility facing ever 
existing uncertainties and inadvertent consequences of politics. With regard to an a priori reflection, 
a political concept of reversibility can learn from Environmental Sciences (inter alia Pa-
lumbi/McLeod/Gruenbaum 2008) and Economics where the term ‘reversibility’ is discussed with 
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regard to the insights that policy consequences can and should, if not be inverted to an original status 
quo ante then at least be partially reversible. This is illustrated best in economics discussions of the 
conditions for successful investments and the contingency and unpredictability of market contexts 
and consumer behaviour why not only the strategies, but also their consequences should be reversi-
ble. Also, these discussions emphasise, just as policy process studies, that action consequences do 
not unfold en bloc and all at once, but in sequential and non-linear series (Andrew/Eberly, 1994, 
1996; Patillo, 1998; Ramsey and Rothman, 1996).  
The a posteriori and a priori distinction of the temporal dimension of reversibility is helpful 
for a further specification of the concept. This distinction can be related to contemporary discussions 
in IR about time and the basic distinction in the Greek notions of chronos and kairos (Hom, 2018a, 
b; Hutchings, 2008), i.e., between the notion of time as linear and chronological (also termed ‘ho-
mologous empty time’; Anderson, 1983) and time as seen through the language of contingency and 
the unexpected, surprising event (as exemplarily problematised by Plutarch in his Moralia, ‘The Ob-
solescence of Oracles’). While in its a posteriori-dimension reversibility can look back in hindsight 
at consolidated consequences and can assess (even though not in total as they are always in a process 
of still unfolding) their conciliation with contingency/perspectivity and negation/refutability, and if 
necessary rectify and mitigate their impact, it sits with chronos. In its a priori-dimension as action-
theoretical ethics and the avoidance of future consequences which harm contingency and nega-
tion/refutability, reversibility sits with kairotic time and its emphasis of sudden, unexpected, and un-
predictable events. The further discussion of these themes would also include the question of how 
this relates to the notions of ‘advent’ and ‘event’ in Jacques Derrida (see amongst others the discus-
sions in Behr, 2014: 109-112). 
Before further research in these complexities and in the questions outlined above, it has been 
necessary, however, to establish the conceptual foundations of a political concept of reversibility of 
which two philosophical guiding principles – the perspectivity and contingency of politics and the 
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inherent potentiality of the failure and of inadvertent consequences of each concept and action – res-
onate with policy research. This observation, complemented with the notion of noesis, paved the way 
for a conversation on political ontology and its epistemological effects between political philosophy 
in IR and policy research, making space for, and attempting to bring in, explicit normative thinking 
into policy studies. 
The two basic demands resulting from reversibility are, briefly summarised: First, a political 
ethics which is informed by, and upholds, the importance to consider global policy consequences in 
light of their reversibility and subsequently to avoid policies which have non-irreversible conse-
quences as they would contradict intrinsic human conditions of politics. One might counter that this 
leads to rather passive politics; and yes, this is precisely what a concept of reversibility would hold, 
finally propagating humility rather than activism. And the remedy for already impacting irreversible 
consequences of past politics would not be further non-irreversible policies with the hope to turn 
back previous consequences, but to develop policies which mitigate and absorb previous non-
irreversible consequences. The concept of reversibility thus promotes an ethics of avoidance of fur-
ther, the stop of enacted, and the mitigation of previous harm through irreversible consequences, 
based on political humility in the face of political contingencies, inadvertencies, and ever unstable 
political existence; not of the idea that caused harm could be undone by, possibly again non-
irreversible activist politics. Such political ethics of reversibility as responsible politics should – I 
may conclude here, but further discussion on public deliberation would be needed – not only guide 
policy-making, but public political discourse in general.  
The second demand results in transnationally and globally institutionalised mechanisms in 
political decision-making and policy-implementation that interfere when non-irreversible policies are 
being enacted and which bring such enacting to a pause and possibly still stand. A careful assessment 
of the impact and the consequences of policies is needed here triggering the intervention of such 
mechanism, such as qualified majorities or vetoes, which would function as both pre-emptive (i.e., 
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interfering due to an immediate risk of non-irreversibility) and preventive (i.e., alerting to and deter-
ring the possibility and likelihood of such risks) institutional arrangements. Such awareness and 
alertness requires politically the widest possible inclusion and empowerment of people conceivably 
concerned and harmed by certain policies, irrespective of national politics, borders, and citizenship.20 
However, these are just outlines, and, as noted above, the concrete elaboration of such mechanisms 
needs the intense cooperation between political philosophy, policy research, and policy-makers, 
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1 See also the panel “30 Years of Critique: Critical Theorising and World Politics” at the 36th 
Annual Conference of the British International Studies Association BISA in Manchester (UK), 28th 
April 2011; also Yalvaç, 2015. 
2 To the spectrum of contemporary political and social theories received in critical IR belong most 
importantly authors such as Arendt, 1958; Adorno, 1973 [1966]; Butler/Laclau/Zizek, 2000; Derrida, 
1993; Habermas, 1994 [1968]; Hardin 2003; Rorty, 1989; Simmel, 1977; Schütz, 1972; Taylor, 
1989; Nason 2012; Connolly 2011. 
3 Ethics is here understood according to Zygmunt Baumann as critical reflection on the conditions of 
political judgement. Such critical reflection, as will be argued and developed here, consists of the 
triangulation of contingency, negation, and noesis, and subsequently to act politically following the 
concept of reversibility. 
4 This claim is shared with many ideology-critical discussions, debated in the literature as 
‘pejorative’ understandings of ideology (as in Voegelin, 1938; Morgenthau, 1946; Arendt, 1951). 
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Also Derrida’s notion of “aporia” suggests the opening-up of intellectual and social spaces, keeping 
them unoccupied, against the foreclosure through ideologies and their essentialism (see Derrida, 
1992, 1997, 2007; for a further interpretation see Behr, 2014). 
5 Important is here the aspect that consequences can never be revised to some original status quo, but 
only partially. Therefore, I will occasionally use in the following for the lack of a better term the 
admittedly non-elegant language of non-irreversible consequences, rather than ‘reversibility’ which 
might suggest the total revision of consequences. 
6 In political science and International Relations I encountered only six literal references to 
“reversibility” (Gallop, 2006; Galtung, 2003; Hamilton/Hamilton, 1983; Joppke, 2005; Pridham, 
2007; Young, 1994); yet, as these writings and individual discussions revealed, their authors do not 
conceptualise this term, but use it in its colloquial meaning of reciprocity and inversion. Extending 
the research into the wider field of social science disciplines shows that the same colloquial meaning 
seems to prevail in the likewise peripheral use of this term in, for example, technology (Introna, 
2007), anthropology (Alberto/Willerslev, 2007), psychology (Neisser, 1973), religious studies (Mou, 
2004; Yagi, 1982), performing arts (Kozel, 1995), moral (analytic) philosophy (Brook, 1987; 
Henson, 1973), or phenomenology (Dillon, 1983; Sarukkai, 2002; Stawarska, 2002). 
7 Hans Morgenthau and Herbert Marcuse are amongst the earliest post-WWII social scientists to 
make the commitments of contingency and negation in an explicit, precise, and practically-oriented 
way. This is the reason why they have been selected here, being aware that they are, of course, not 
the only authors from whom these notions could be elaborated. But their work significantly helps to 
sharpen these concepts (see also Behr, 2017). And Eric Voegelin is amongst the most prolific con-
temporary authors on Plato and Aristotle and their notion of noesis. In methodological terms, it is 
worth noting that I do neither aspire, nor claim, nor deem possible a truthful and authentic represen-
tation of named (and other) authors, rather than reading them hermeneutically as inspiration to en-
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gage a certain problematic which the paper shares with them, following the idea of symptomatic 
reading (see Althusser, 1965; Behr, 2014; Rooney, 2017). 
8 Thinking of a bridging exercise between philosophy in IR and policy-oriented literature, it would 
be interesting also to ask in how far approaches of policy learning (e.g. Rose 2005), policy change, 
and policy dismantling (e.g. Bauer/Knill, 2014; Jordan et al., 2013) or the neo-functionalist concept 
of spill-back (see inter alias Schmitter 2002 [2003]) may account, though they not use the term 
‘reversibility’, in different ways for possibilities of reversion. For reasons mentioned, this paper 
focuses on policy process studies. 
9 Morgenthau and Classical Realism in general stand here under the influence and in the legacies of 
Nietzschean thinking about ‘objectivity’ and the relation between observer and the-thing observed in 
the humanities and social sciences; see Nietzsche, 2003; Frei, 2001; the Introduction to Morgenthau, 
2012. 
10 See in his Politics Among Nations from the 1954-edition onwards; for a deeper discussion of 
contingency in Morgenthau’s writings see also Williams, 2004. 
11 Further to his published oeuvre, including Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946) and 
‘Reflections on the state of Political Science’ (here 1962b), we have additional evidence from his 
1952-lecture ‘Philosophy of International Relations’ as well as from letters between Morgenthau and 
Karl Gottfried Kindermann from the 1960s; see Morgenthau Archive, Law Library, Library of 
Congress Washington, Box 33. 
12 For this realist epistemological position, see Feldman, 1999: 93: ‘The application of the general 
idea of context dependence to knowledge attributions is straightforward. What it takes for a 
knowledge (…) to be true can vary from context to context’; see also DeRose, 2009; Feldman, 2001. 
13 In this German writings Voegelin terms this “Spannung zum Grund”; for the English version see 
(2002) ‘What is Political Reality?’.  
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14 We read: ‘The tension toward the ground is the material structure of consciousness but not an ob-
ject of propositions; rather it is a process of consciousness having degrees of transparency for itself. 
In the noetic experience, consciousness attains its optimum luminosity in which the tension toward 
the ground can interpret its own logos’ (“What is Political Reality?”, 2002). 
15 It is an interesting question in how far this claim resonates with Derrida’s notion of ‘erasure’ 
(Anderson 2012). 
16 See for example Cairney/Heikka, 2014; Sabatier, 1991; Weible, 2014; Zahariadis, 2014. The 
guidelines for theory, according to Sabatier (1999: 266), include ‘be clear enough to be proven 
wrong’, ‘make the concepts of the framework/theory as abstract as possible’, ‘develop a coherent 
model of the individual’, ‘work on internal consistencies and interconnections’, ‘think causal pro-
cess’, ‘ develop a long-term research programme …’, and ‘use multiple theories if possible’. 
17 Weible, 2014: 392; see also and already Charles Lindblom (1968: 4): “We are going to look at 
policy making as an extremely complex analytical and political process to which there is no begin-
ning and no end, and the boundaries of which are most uncertain.” 
18 McBeth/Jones/Shanahan, 2014: 226. See hereto already Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan 
1950: ‘Our aim … is not to rewrite … manuals [of political action] but rather to elaborate a 
conceptual framework within which inquiry into the political process may fruitfully proceed’ 
(Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950: ix-x). 
19 So does Christopher Weible in his concluding chapter of Theories of the Policy Process write that 
policy research is and should be ‘broad in scope and salient for society’ (2014: 391). This 
formulation reveals the idea that policy research contributes to the well-being of society. However, 
there is no clarification of, or reflection upon, the democratic nature of policy as such, but this seems 
to be a silent presupposition (see also Schneider/Ingram/Deleon, 2014). 
20 An example might be the law case “State of Hawai’i and Ismail Elshikh vs. Donald J. Trump” that 
declared Trump’s executive order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
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United States” from January 27, 2017 as unconstitutional (see Case 1:17, CV 00050-DKW-KSC 
from March 15, 2017) and based its dismissal on the argument of the avoidance of ‘irreparable’ and 
‘irrevocable’ consequences for large parts of the American and of migrant populations. This 
judgement and its justification seems guided by a noetic reflection on humanity linked with the 
unforeseeable nature of policy consequences on people and humanity (see the self-reflections on the 
judgement 28/43; 32/43; 38/43). The decision addresses both identifiable consequences and rectifies 
those a posteriori (e.g. with regard to consequences for HE/the University of Hawaii with regard to 
fees) and possible future consequences, thus a priori, with regard to “intangible impacts” (17/43) and 
“irrevocable damage on personal and professional lives” (18/43; 28/43; 40/43) as well as regard to 
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